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Barry Markovsky
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ABSTRACT
Social scientists have a clear choice in how they may approach theory development.
One path leads to "nebulous" theories that lack any real explanatory power. The
other path capitalizes on evolutionary principles of variation and selection, vastly
increasing the chances for explanatory success. I illustrate these ideas by reference to
"artificial life" programs, and discuss the implications for theory construction in the
social sciences.
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In social psychology as in other scientific disciplines, the subject of evolution and
natural selection processes is not so distant as it may first appear from the work we do
and the substantive issues we address. Because these processes affect the way theories
grow and change, they influence (1) what we are justified in asserting as claims to
knowledge, and (2) how those claims must be formed and treated in order for them to
fulfill their explanatory purposes. In fact, if one is indifferent to the evolutionary
dynamics of theories and especially to the sort of logical and semantic standards that
allow those dynamics to operate, then one's claims to knowledge will be prone to fatal
deficiencies.

In 1959 Donald T. Campbell coined the term "Evolutionary epistemology." (See
Campbell 1974 for a more widely-available source.) This is the study of evolutionary
processes, concepts, and explanations. Evolutionary epistemologists like to explore
the generality of evolutionary principles, and discuss them not only in the contexts of
biology and archeology, but also as applied to such problems as the evolution of
human cognition, culture, and science. It is the last category--the evolution of
scientific knowledge--that connects us to issues of cumulative theory-building.
Our field generally lacks the shared logical and semantic standards for constructing
and evaluating theories--standards that characterize more scientific disciplines and
that promote cumulative theorizing. As a result, the majority of sociological
knowledge claims emanate from theorists who do not attend to such issues. This
means that nearly all theories are expressed discursively. Moreover, programs of
explicit, sound, cumulative theoretical development are so rare in our field that those
who involve themselves in such work often are marginalized or even denigrated.
Elsewhere (Markovsky 1994) I presented criteria for theory-building and argued that
theories must develop incrementally and cumulatively. There I concluded with the
idea that nebulousness rather than knowledge is the inevitable product unless a
discipline's members apply rigorous semantic and logical standards to its theories.
Nebulous theories are at odds with what arguably is the intent of all theorists: to
produce abstract and general statements that explain and predict classes of empirical
phenomena.
Social psychology's overall lack of scientific standards for theoretical logic and clarity
is its most important and far-reaching problem by far. We are in the business of
explaining and predicting things. It is a sure bet that unless we can train our theories
to develop evolutionarily, they will never get better at explaining and predicting.
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EVOLUTION AND THEORY GROWTH
Following are several important insights offered by an evolutionary epistemology
applied to the growth of theories.
(1) Cumulative theories manifest deductive subsumption (Freese 1980). Useful
components of an earlier version of a cumulative theory (e.g., statements having high
predictive power) are retained in, or derivable from, later versions of the theory. The
reverse is not true. Later versions of the theory, presumably having broader and

deeper coverage than earlier versions, will not be derivable from those earlier
versions.
(2) Explanations that do not show any evolutionary growth cannot be scientific
theories. At best they are proto-theories awaiting further development--as when the
"theory" consists of little more than generalizations induced from a limited set of
observations. At worst, non-evolving explanations are pseudo-theories, posing as
scientific theories but failing to satisfy appropriate criteria when examined skeptically.
Proto- and pseudo-theoretical explanations are unlikely ever to provide precise,
reliable, accurate, and robust predictions for empirical phenomena. There are just too
many ways for them to be wrong in a complex world, and too weak a mechanism for
self-correction. Without the benefit of the empirical and theoretical methods of
science, chances are remote that the theorist will guess correctly.
(3) Cumulative or evolutionary development depends on selection processes. More
specifically, as Toulmin (1967) noted, theory evolution depends on generating
competing intellectual variants that are carried, diffused, and selectively retained by
populations of scientists. Popper (1972) is famous for emphasizing that selection
should be based on a theory's ability to survive strong empirical tests, but that is not
enough. He presumed a shared understanding of how to derive valid predictions and
conclusions from the theory. In the social sciences, theorists often couch their
arguments in vague terms, then proceed as if nobody else is qualified to derive and
test hypotheses from their theories. This practice is pervasive and tolerated, and
undermines the communality and intersubjectivity of the selection processes that must
be at the heart of any scientific discipline.
(4) There are many different types of theory selection processes, but most lead
nowhere. Too often selection is based on the whims of authorities, politics, wishful
thinking, political correctness, etc. Knowledge in non-scientific disciplines changes
over time in various ways, and selection processes of various sorts are imposed on
them. Despite such changes, however, the work does not exhibitevolutionary growth
and cannot deductively subsume earlier efforts. The best products of today's artistic
and literary disciplines certainly are different from those a half-century ago. However,
there is no objective criterion by which it makes sense to assert that the work has
come closer to achieving shared intellectual goals.
(5) For a selection processes to operate rationally and efficiently, individual theories
must satisfy a set of eight semantic, logical, and empirical criteria (Markovsky 1996):
They must be free of contradictions, free of ambivalence, communicable, abstract,
general, precise, parsimonious, and conditional. So even if our field embraced the idea
that our theories must be cumulative and evolve through a process of variation and
selection, the individual theories still must be well-formed to make this process work.

This is because when we talk about "rational" selection among theoretical alternatives,
we mean selecting for further enhancement only those theories that are the most
precise, parsimonious, communicable, etc.
(6) Finally, evolutionary epistemology applied to theories is more than mere
metaphor. Theories are phenomenal entities that actually can and do evolve. (See
Berger and Zelditch, 1993, for a number of examples.)
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THE "ARITIFICIAL LIFE" OF THEORIES
Even more remarkable and exciting than the applicability of basic Darwinian ideas to
theory growth, contemporary developments in the study of evolutionary processes
also apply. Work in the area of "artificial life" may have special relevance. Much of
the interest in the area traces back to John Conway's famous game "Life," popularized
by Gardner (1970) in his Mathematical Games columns in Scientific American. Life,
is a "cellular automata" model, the output of which is best viewed on a computer
screen. The image is a matrix of cells, each of which can light up (come to life) or
blink off (die), depending on the states of other cells in their immediate environments.
A remarkable array of patterns and dynamics is exhibited by Life, depending only on
the starting arrangements of cells and simple rules for when a cell turns on and turns
off.
Life was only the beginning. Now there are programs that illustrate or simulate
evolutionary processes in a variety of ways (Prata 1993), and others that use
evolutionary learning to solve complex problems (Bainbridge, Brent, Carley, Heise,
Macy, Markovsky and Skvoretz 1994). Unlike evolutionary biology, artificial life is
not restricted to the single case-study of terrestrial evolution.
Evolutionary learning models are especially relevant for us. Social phenomena are
complex, and we are unlikely to induce full-blown explanations in only one or a few
initial attempts. However, if we establish the conditions for evolutionary learning via
the theories we construct and the tests we perform, then our theories can only
improve. This is demonstrated by a program called WORDEVOL (Prata 1993). Take
the 19-character phrase "this is a fine time". We want our "theory" to correctly induce
19 corresponding elements letters and spaces. The total number of 19-character strings
is 27 raised to the 19th power. Using a personal computer to generate random 19character strings at 8,000 per second, there is a 50-50 chance of hitting the correct
target string in 6 quadrillion years. This is the monkeys-at- typewriters approach, and
it also describes non-cumulative theorizing in sociology. In general, sociology

rewards those who produce never-before-seen theories--or things called "theories" by
their authors--and generally punishes those who work on incremental, evolutionary
developments, never pretending to make huge strides in fell swoops.
The evolutionary learning computer program takes a different approach.
WORDEVOL uses a simple algorithm to match the 19-character string: Generate 20
random strings, find the best-fitting one, generate 20 mutated offspring from it,
choose the best-fitting one, and so on. Instead of a 50-50 chance in 6 quadrillion
years, the expected time until a perfect match is around one-fifth of a second.
[27]
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY-BUILDING
Imagine how much more efficient our theoretical learning could become if we
collectively generated theoretical variants and culled only successes by applying
rational selection criteria. A bottom-up approach to theory-building would be
analogous to this bottom-up approach of artificial life models: Start with relatively
simple abstract and general theories, and test, revise and re-test their consequences
against selected natural settings that fall within theoretical scope conditions. It does
not matter if the theory starts small. As Campbell (1974) points out, a research
tradition working with even a trivial topic, to which are applied strong selection
criteria, advances more rapidly than research focused on a more important problem
but whose researchers lack a sharp and consistent selection system. The problemcentered orientation to which Campbell alludes is the top-down approach: start with
observations from the natural world and try to model them.
Importantly, the evolutionary development of theories via the bottom-up approach
cannot be sustained without a critical mass of theories that satisfy the logical and
semantic criteria described above. If the meanings of theoretical terms are muddy, or
if an argument does not possess logical integrity, then the conformity of evidence with
the predictions of such a theory is immaterial. Although it is more work to develop a
highly coherent and comprehensible theory than to offer one faring more poorly on
such criteria, there is a benefit: even a relatively simple bottom-up theory, when wellcrafted, can generate predictions for emergent behaviors that are far more numerous
and complex than the assumptions that compose the theory. In contrast, top-down
approaches tend to become encumbered over time with numerous ad hoc assumptions.
With no consistent selection criteria, there is no point of criticality at which the
ponderous, non-parsimonious approach becomes extinct in favor of the simpler, more
powerful competitor.

Punctuated equilibria, an idea popularized by Stephen J. Gould, also can emerge in the
process of theory evolution. The idea is that the outward manifestations of genetic
instructions exhibit punctuated equilibria--periods of relative quiescence separated by
periods of rapid change. In working with network exchange theory for more than a
decade, I can attest to such a process. Generally the theory changes almost
imperceptibly most of the time, but occasionally one tiny alteration helps to explain an
entire new range of phenomena. If the theory's terms and assumptions are its "genes,"
then it is the suddenly expanded range of derived hypotheses regarding observable
phenomena that represent the theory's "outward manifestations."
Another modern evolutionary view is that selection and evolution occur
simultaneously at different levels of analysis. Cell structures evolve, organs evolve,
organisms evolve, and populations evolve. Each operates within its own environment,
subject to corresponding selection pressures, and nested within other environments.
So it is with theories. We cannot assemble words within statements capriciously. We
define and arrange terms in ways that seem best suited (or most "fit") to express the
ideas we wish to communicate. If meanings are not communicated unambiguously,
then we modify terms, rearrange our phrasing, and/or clarify definitions. At the same
time, at a "higher" level, we compose statements into theoretical arguments. This also
requires great care, for at this level statements must integrate into a coordinated where
rules of logic impose selection pressures. At a still higher level, this set of statements
operates in an environment that may include other sets which are variants, elaborants,
proliferants or competitors vis-a-vis one another (Wagner 1984).
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CONCLUSION
Thinking about theories from the perspective of the evolutionary epistemologist
should motivate us to establish conditions and engage in practices that promote
cumulative theoretical growth. Such changes would affect how social scientists
theorize, moving them toward the programmatic study of theoretically-motivated
problems. Importantly, it also would affect the collective evaluation of those
individual products. Among other emphases, special attention would have to be paid
to the consistent application of rational selection criteria for publications, along with
the encouragement of competing research programs. If we truly want our field to have
better theories, then it would seem that we have little choice in these matters.
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